FAY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Kathryn Pereda ("Pereda") appeals the district court's dismissal of her two-count complaint alleging interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., against Appellee Brookdale Senior Living Communities ("Brookdale"). The district court held that because Pereda was not an eligible employee at the time she was terminated, she could not bring either claim under the FMLA. This appeal presents an issue of first impression for this Circuit: whether the FMLA protects a pre-eligibility request
Brookdale operates senior living facilities. Pereda began her employment at the facility located at The Preserve at Palm-Aire in Pompano Beach, Florida on October 5, 2008. She was terminated 11 months later, in September of 2009. In June of 2009, Brookdale was advised that Pereda was pregnant and would be requesting FMLA leave after the birth of her child on or about November 30, 2009. Pereda alleges that, prior to Brookdale learning about her pregnancy, she was a top employee. After learning about her pregnancy, Pereda alleges that Brookdale began harassing her, causing stress and other complications in her pregnancy. In addition, Pereda alleges that Brookdale's management began denigrating her job performance and placed her on a performance improvement plan with unattainable goals.
At the time of these complications, Pereda was eligible for accrued sick and personal leave. Pereda alleges that she was told by management that she could make doctors visits. Yet, after placing Pereda on the performance improvement plan, management began writing her up for taking leave to visit the doctor. Pereda alleges that other employees were not written up for taking the same. In August of 2009, Pereda took a few days off, notifying Brookdale via e-mail. When she returned to work, she was again written up by management for not getting verbal authorization for her absence.
Later that same month, Pereda continued to suffer more pregnancy-related medical issues. Pereda alleges that management told her she was eligible for non-FMLA leave, including the use of sick, personal, and vacation days. In early September, she again took time off after her physician instructed that she needed bed rest. She left a message with the Executive Director, but never heard back. Several days after she was finally able to reach someone at Brookdale, she was fired.
On May 11, 2010, Pereda filed her Complaint against Brookdale alleging claims for interference (Count I) and retaliation (Count II) under the FMLA. Her Complaint asserted that "Brookdale [interfered with her] FMLA rights, insofar as Brookdale denied Pereda benefits under the FMLA to which she was entitled, and terminated her for attempting to exercise those rights." Brookdale moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On September 22, 2010,
We review a dismissal of a complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Speaker v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). We "accept[] the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[ ] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id.
Before the Court is the question left open by Walker v. Elmore County Board of Education, 379 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir.2004): "whether the FMLA protects a pre-eligibility request for post-eligibility maternity leave."
Under section 2615(a) of the FMLA, an employee may bring two types of claims: interference claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer denied or otherwise interfered with his substantive rights under the Act; and retaliation claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer discriminated against him because he engaged in an activity protected by the Act. Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir.2001) (citations omitted).
In order to receive FMLA protections, one must be both eligible, meaning having worked the requisite hours,
Here, it is undisputed that Pereda, at the time she requested leave, was not eligible for FMLA protection because she had not worked the requisite hours and had not yet experienced a triggering event, the birth of her child. It is also undisputed that she would have been entitled to FMLA protection by the time she gave birth and began her requested leave.
Pereda argues that if the district court decision is allowed to stand, employees will fear mentioning leave in anticipation of the birth of a child. Moreover, employees would cease to provide their employers with adequate notice of an impeding absence in fear of retaliation. Brookdale counters that Pereda was not an FMLA eligible employee at any point during her employment because she was terminated well before the 12-month/1,250 hour requirement. Because she was not an eligible employee, she was not entitled to any protection pursuant to the FMLA and both her claims were properly dismissed. Moreover, Brookdale argues that Pereda's anticipated eligibility was not sufficient to make her an eligible employee under the FMLA in June 2009, when Brookdale learned of her pregnancy.
After examining the various elements of the FMLA regulatory scheme, such as the 30-day notice requirement and the DOL implementing regulations, we conclude that allowing the district court's ruling to stand would violate the purposes for which the FMLA was enacted. Without protecting against pre-eligibility interference, a loophole is created whereby an employer has total freedom to terminate an employee before she can ever become eligible. Such a situation is contrary to the basic concept of the FMLA. Thus, this Court disagrees with the district court and finds that Pereda stated sufficient facts to establish prima facie claims for both FMLA interference and retaliation. We address each claim in turn.
The FMLA makes it illegal "for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or
We hold that because the FMLA requires notice in advance of future leave, employees are protected from interference prior to the occurrence of a triggering event, such as the birth of a child. The FMLA mandates that, "In any case in which the necessity for leave ... is foreseeable based on an expected birth or placement, the employee shall provide the employer with not less than 30 days' notice, before the date the leave is to begin, of the employee's intention to take leave...." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1). The notice period was meant as protection for employers to provide them with sufficient notice of extended absences. "It would be illogical to interpret the notice requirement in a way that requires employees to disclose requests for leave which would, in turn, expose them to retaliation, or interference, for which they have no remedy." Reynolds v. Inter-Indus. Conf. On Auto Collision Repair, 594 F.Supp.2d 925, 928 (N.D.Ill.2009).
Without remedy, the advanced notice requirement becomes a trap for newer employees and extends to employers a significant exemption from liability. Beffert v. Pa. Dep't. Of Pub. Welfare, No. Civ. A. 05-43, 2005 WL 906362, at *3 (E.D.Pa., April 18, 2005). Such an interpretation is inconsistent with FMLA and the purpose of the Act. If we were to hold that Pereda had no cause of action for interference because she had not yet been employed the full 1,250 hours during a 12-month period, or given birth to her child, than she should not be required to give her employer any advance notice of impending leave. As the statute requires advance notice, logic mandates that FMLA be read to allow a cause of action for employees who, like Pereda, in goodwill exceed the notice requirement.
In support of its position, Brookdale argues that, pursuant to DOL's implementing regulation 29 C.F.R. § 825.112, employees are eligible for FMLA leave only upon the delivery of a child. Eligibility is but one aspect of the regulation. Notice of a future trigger event is another. It is axiomatic that the delivery of a child is necessary in order for FMLA leave to actually commence, but that requirement does not open the door for pre-eligible interference with FMLA rights with impunity. Furthermore, that regulation cannot be read in isolation. Taken together with other regulations addressing leave, it is clear that the FMLA scheme intends that a determination as to FMLA eligibility be made "as of the date the FMLA leave is to start." 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d). Moreover, the "reference to `employee' rather than `eligible employee' ... is a recognition that some employees will and should give notice of future leave before they have been on the job for twelve months." Beffert, 2005 WL 906362, at *3. Notice of an
Thus, because the statute contemplates notice of leave in advance of becoming eligible, i.e., giving birth to a child, the FMLA regulatory scheme must necessarily protect pre-eligible employees such as Pereda, who put their employers on notice of a post-eligibility leave request. An expectant mother who is along in her pregnancy cannot hide that, in due time, she will give birth to a child. By the very nature of the fact that a full-term pregnancy takes nine months to complete, not affording pre-eligible expecting parents any protection would leave them exposed to adverse action by their employer.
Although there are no Eleventh Circuit decisions on point, there is helpful precedent on the meaning of "employee" for FMLA purposes. While on concededly distinct facts, here we must construe Pereda as "eligible" for protection if we are to honor the purpose for which FMLA was enacted. In Smith v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 273 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir.2001), we held that a former employee who alleged that his employer retaliated against him in its decision not to rehire him is considered an "employee" within the meaning of the FMLA. We further explained that a narrow interpretation would permit an employer to evade the FMLA by blacklisting an employee that the employer suspects is likely to take advantage of the Act. Id. at 1307 (citing Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.1998)). Here, the interpretation that Brookdale urges would similarly frustrate the purpose of the FMLA by permitting employers to eliminate staff that the employer perceives will need FMLA.
In that same vein, Brookdale argues that the term "eligible employee" in the FMLA evinces clear congressional intent to limit the right to bring private actions. This Court does not disagree entirely. An employee has to be both eligible and entitled to FMLA leave on the day her FMLA leave is to commence. As stated above, these requirements do not open the door for pre-eligibility interference with FMLA rights. Contrary to Brookdale's contentions, the Court's holding today does not expand FMLA coverage to a new class of employees. We are simply holding that a pre-eligible employee has a cause of action if an employer terminates her in order to avoid having to accommodate that employee with rightful FMLA leave rights once that employee becomes eligible.
Turning to Pereda's claim for FMLA retaliation, in order to state a prima facie case, Pereda must show that: "(1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) the decision was casually related to a protected activity." Walker, 379 F.3d at 1252 (citing Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207). After concluding that Pereda was not eligible for FMLA benefits, the district court ruled that she therefore could not have engaged in statutorily protected activity, even if she would have become eligible at some point in the future.
Because we have concluded that the FMLA protects a pre-eligibility request for post-eligibility maternity leave, we hold that Pereda could also state a cause of action for FMLA retaliation. Here, we need only address the first prong of FMLA's retaliation analysis. Under the allegations of the Complaint, Pereda was engaged in statutorily protected activity when she discussed with her employer the FMLA leave she was denied after the birth of her baby.
Under the FMLA an employee need not be currently exercising her rights or currently eligible for FMLA leave in order to be protected from retaliation. The FMLA makes it "unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right" provided under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The FMLA also protects employees and prospective employees even if the individual is not currently eligible or entitled to leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (prohibiting employers from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have previously used FMLA leave); see also Potts v. Franklin Elec. Co., No. Civ. 05-443, 2006 WL 2474964, at *1 (E.D.Okla.2006) (holding an employee who gave notice of expected FMLA leave could bring a retaliation claim even though a triggering event never occurred). In Potts, the district court reasoned that "[i]f courts were to read the FMLA to allow employers to dismiss ineligible employees who give advance notice of their need for FMLA leave, it would open a large loophole in the law and undermine the plain language and purpose of the notice requirement in § 2612(e)(1)." 2006 WL 2474964, at *3. Similarly, the FMLA protects Pereda from retaliation, even though at the time of her request and termination, she was not yet eligible or entitled to FMLA leave because she had not yet given birth.
Brookdale warns of a slippery slope where, if Pereda's argument is accepted, an employee could be deemed FMLA eligible from the first week of employment. However, as the court mentioned in Reynolds, "The scenario in which an employee works eight hours and then requests foreseeable FMLA leave beginning in 364 days ... is a non-starter." 594 F.Supp.2d at 930. That employee, just as Pereda, still could be terminated for legitimate reasons, such as poor performance or dishonesty. Moreover, liability to that employee could also be denied for failure to meet other requirements of the FMLA. Our decision today simply means that pre-eligible discussion of post-eligible FMLA leave is protected activity under the FMLA. Accordingly, because Pereda engaged in protected activity by discussing her maternity plans with her employer,
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.